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Abstract 
Sweatshop labor has been condemned by scholars, activists, students and 
consumers in more developed countries on charges of wrongful exploitation, and a failure 
to respect the dignity, and basic needs of sweatshop workers. This paper surveys charges 
against sweatshop labor, and some of the more influential arguments for, and against, 
rectifying the background structural injustices that perpetuate it. I argue that in certain 
sweatshop cases, compensating workers below a prima facie morally acceptable level can 
be most successful in striving towards the duty of beneficence that employers owe to 
their employees. Therefore, we ought to pursue utility-maximizing acts over others in 
better alignment with a deontic duty to compensate employees at a certain level. I 
eventually conclude that this debate is a paradigm example of deontological versus 
utilitarian moral judgments. Sometimes, utility maximizing acts are morally 
impermissible. Sometimes, adhering to deontic duties instead of committing a wrong to 
produce a right is morally required. In the circumstances that I describe, the morally right 
acts ought to be those that are most successful in maximizing overall utility for the most 
number of people. This responsibility coincides with acts that may not compensate 
workers at a prima facie morally acceptable level, but incidentally maximize overall 
utility, welfare and autonomy for some of the world‟s most marginalized and 
impoverished people.  
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Introduction 
In the early 1990s, United States citizens became increasingly aware of some of 
more gruesome effects of globalization and international trade. Consumers in more 
developed nations started to see the often excruciating conditions under which many of 
their goods were being produced. Stories and images of marginalized and impoverished 
employees working in unsafe conditions, for inhumane hours, in exchange for minimal 
and unfair wages began to seep into the public eye.
1
 Activists, scholars and university 
students condemned sweatshops
2
 and the multinational enterprises (MNEs) who 
contracted them. Much of their criticisms were grounded in the basic moral intuition that 
exploiting some of the world‟s poorest people is wrong.3 Some people, usually 
economists, responded that many of these critics had neglected to consider the positive 
benefits enjoyed by all parties when sweatshops enter a lesser developed country, and felt 
                                                          
1
Several of the authors that I will cite in this paper have described the negative responses to sweatshop 
labor and awareness in the United States. They cite news articles from the Los Angeles Times (“Doing 
Business: New Shots Fired in Indonesia Wage War: U.S. Labor is Urging Trade Action Against a Land 
Where Daily Take-Home Pay Is Measured in Cents”), The Chicago Tribune (“Wages of Shame”). They 
recount protests in front of Nike stores ("Justice Do It! The Nike Transnational Advocacy Network: 
Organization, Collective Actions, and Outcomes." Sociology of sport journal (0741-1235), 16 (3), p. 206) 
and Kathee Lee Gifford crying during congressional testimony over the accusation that child laborers were 
working in unjust conditions to manufacture her clothing line. For a sampling see Ian Maitland, “The Great 
Non-Debate Over International Sweatshops,” in Honest Work A Business Ethics Reader, 2nd edition. Joanne 
B. Ciulla and Clancy Martin and Robert C. Solomon (USA: Oxford University Press, 2010), 428-38; John 
Miller, “Why Economists are Wrong About Sweatshops and the Antisweatshop movement,” Challenge, 
46:1. (February 2003): accessed February 6, 2014, Illiad; Powell, Benjamin, and Matt Zwolinski. "The 
Ethical and Economic Case against Sweatshop Labor: A Critical Assessment." Journal Of Business Ethics 
107, no. 4: 449-472 (2012). Philosopher's Index, EBSCOhost (accessed April 27, 2014); and Chris 
Meyers."Wrongful Beneficence: Exploitation and Third World Sweatshops." Journal Of Social Philosophy 
35, no. 3: 319-333 (2004). Philosopher's Index, EBSCOhost (accessed April 27, 2014).  
2
 The term “sweatshop” is difficult because many scholars disagree on its definition. Some definitions are 
too narrow to be useful in moral analysis, others are overly pejorative.  For the purposes of this paper, I will 
employ Matt Zwolinski‟s definition because it is appropriately pejorative while allowing for the possibility 
that sweatshops could be morally justifiable: A sweatshop is “a place of employment in which worker 
compensation or safety is compromised, child labor is employed, and/or local labor regulations are 
routinely disregarded in a way that is prima facie morally objectionable.” Matt Zwolinski. “Structural 
Exploitation.” Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (2012): 162, accessed February 14, 2014. Philpapers.org. 
3
 A helpful overview of these arguments and scholars can be found in Powell and Zwolinski,“The Ethical 
and Economic Case.”  
2 
 
that activists and protestors did not understand the complicated reasons and systems that 
dictated the existence of low-wage labor in the first place. In defense of sweatshop labor, 
proponents began to construct arguments grounded in neo-classical economic theory.
4
 
They argued that sweatshop jobs are frequently the best available option for some of the 
world‟s poorest people to provide for themselves and their families. To take these jobs 
away would be to pull up the ladder as the desperate and marginalized finally begin to 
climb out of devastating poverty.  
Sweatshop defenders generally support some variation of the classical libertarian 
view which argues that a self-regulating, lassaiz faire approach to regulation results in 
better outcomes for everyone. To require that sweatshops compensate their workers at a 
level above the market rate, or do anything else that requires some sort of additional cost 
on their behalf, might push the market out of equilibrium and effectively shift that cost to 
the workers. The economic assumption behind this view is that any increase in cost for 
sweatshops to produce their goods results in a decrease in demand for labor. The result 
would be to throw workers back into the labor pool and harm the very people that need 
help the most. Though everyone generally agrees that the demand curve is downward 
sloping,
5
 there were discrepancies over interpreting its moral implications for sweatshops 
and the corporations that contract them. Eventually, economists and philosophers on both 
                                                          
4
 For early proponents see Paul Krugman. “In Praise of Cheap Labor.” Slate, March 21, 1997 (accessed 
February 14, 2014); and Maitland, “The Great Non-Debate.” 
5
 As I mention in footnote 6, some have attempted to argue that in some specific circumstances, raising 
costs would not negatively affect the demand for labor to the extent that economists anticipate. Due to the 
highly empirical nature of this question, I am less concerned with this issue than it perhaps ought to 
demand. Zwolinski cites a quote from John Miller (2003) who summarized the debate adequately for 
present purposes. “Either you believe labor demand curves are downward sloping or you don‟t…of course, 
not to believe that demand curves are negatively sloped would be tantamount to declaring yourself an 
economic illiterate.” Zwolinski,“The Ethical and Economic Case,” 450.  
3 
 
sides of the isle came to agree on two previously contested issues: (1) Sweatshop labor is 
often the best available opportunity for the global poor to improve their lives and the 
lives of their families. (2) Any efforts to forbid, restrict or regulate sweatshops must be 
done with extreme caution so as to not make workers worse off.  
Regardless of these stipulations, critics still maintained that sweatshops were 
doing something morally impermissible. They returned with increasingly complex 
accounts of unfairness and wrongful exploitation that incorporated the same widely 
accepted neo-classical economic theories that supported the classical libertarian 
viewpoint. Critics found the economists‟ arguments controversial because they heavily 
relied on empirical data that varied depending on the circumstances. Sweatshop 
opponents presented counter evidence to attack the economic conclusions that supported 
very foundation of the libertarian arguments.
6
 The criticisms became twofold when they 
argued that sweatshop labor, even if mutually accepted and mutually beneficial, can still 
be morally impermissible. They argued that even if empirical evidence and economic 
theory were to prove that the classic libertarian argument maximized overall social utility 
in some instances, it would not necessarily follow that we ought to condone sweatshop 
exploitation – compensating workers with wages or benefits below a morally acceptable 
                                                          
6
 This included witness testimony, international and domestic laws, historical events and economic 
statistics. Some attempted to argue, though certainly not without significant reliance on contestable data 
and various other issues, that the increase in sweatshop wages would not result in layoffs. Douglas K. Adie 
and Lowell Gallaway, review of Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of Minimum Wage, by 
David Card and Alan B. Krueger, Cato Journal Book Reviews vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 1995), 
retrieved from: http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1995/5/cj15n1-8.pdf . 
(Accessed April 20, 2014).  I will have more to say about these views later but for a brief overview see 
John Alexander. "Sweatshops, Context Differentiation, and the Rational Person Standard." Philosophy In 
The Contemporary World 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 68-74. Philosopher's Index, EBSCOhost (accessed 
April 27, 2014); and Coakley, Mathew, and Michael Kates. 2013. "The Ethical and Economic Case for 
Sweatshop Regulation." Journal Of Business Ethics 117, no. 3: 553-558. Philosopher's Index, EBSCOhost 
(accessed April 27, 2014).  
4 
 
level. It is possible to do wrong, they said, even if an action makes everybody better off 
and nobody worse off.
7
 Because the economic debate is largely empirical, arguments in 
the latter vein became the most troublesome for armchair philosophers.  
Arguments focusing more on moral impermissibility than on empirical data have 
been predominately deontological – their claims are largely grounded in an appeal to an 
overarching normative ethical duty, rule, obligation or value. Deontologists generally 
maintain that no matter how much moral good an action can produce, some actions are 
always morally impermissible.
8
  Typically, the deontologists oppose utilitarian, act-
utilitarian, consequentialist or contextualist theories – theories that tend to assign moral 
value based on the outcome of various actions in different contexts. Consequentialists 
generally argue that actions that increase overall “good” are morally right.9 Deontological 
critics might agree with the descriptive components of the classic libertarian position, but 
find its implications unsettling. In response, these critics generally offer a normative 
“duty” derived from Emanuel Kant‟s categorical imperative – an account of respecting 
humans as an ends in themselves rather than as a mere means to an ends – to ground 
                                                          
7
 Many of these critics attacked both the empirical/economic views as well as the philosophical arguments. 
Some argue that sweatshops are impermissible despite Pareto efficiency, while others argue that sweatshop 
regulation may not actually make anybody worse off. See Arnold, Denis G, and Norman E Bowie. 2007. 
"Respect for Workers in Global Supply Chains: Advancing the Debate Over Sweatshops." Business Ethics 
Quarterly 17, no. 1: 135-145. Philosopher's Index, EBSCOhost (accessed April 27, 2014);  Jeremy C. 
Snyder. "Needs Exploitation." Ethical Theory And Moral Practice: An International Forum 11, no. 4: 389-
405 (2008). Philosopher's Index, EBSCOhost (accessed April 27, 2014); Jeremy C. Snyder. "Exploitation 
and Sweatshop Labor: Perspectives and Issues." Business Ethics Quarterly 20, no. 2: 187-213 (2010). 
Philosopher's Index, EBSCOhost (accessed April 27, 2014); Robert Mayer. "Sweatshops, Exploitation, and 
Moral Responsibility." Journal Of Social Philosophy 38, no. 4: 605-619 (2007). Philosopher's Index, 
EBSCOhost (accessed April 27, 2014); and Richard W. Miller. "Moral Closeness and World Community." 
In The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distance Needy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
(2004). Philosopher's Index, EBSCOhost (accessed April 27, 2014). 
8
 For a brief summary of deontology see “Deontological Ethics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last 
modified December 12, 2012. Accessed April 14, 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-
deontological/.   
9
 Ibid.   
5 
 
some sort of special obligation or responsibility.
10
  Though often very complex, these 
accounts argue for a moral obligation on behalf of sweatshops and the MNEs who 
contract them to respect the dignity of their fellow humans by offering some morally 
acceptable package of benefits. Deferring to the market to determine workers‟ wages, 
benefits and ultimately their overall welfare would not be acting in accordance with these 
obligations. They assert that despite certain market restrictions or background structural 
conditions that may legitimately restrict a sweatshop‟s ability to supply these benefits 
without consequence we cannot allow sweatshops to act without any obligations or 
restrictions.
11
 Arguments for lassaiz faire economics do not necessarily entail lassaiz 
faire morality.  
A range of duties and obligations for participants
12
 in exploitative actions or 
systems have been offered by various scholars. These duties span from compensating 
workers with “living wages” even if they are above the current market rate, to organizing 
a politically-oriented collective action effort to reform the macro-level systems that 
oppress third-world laborers.
13
 The basic conclusion is that even if sweatshops make the 
                                                          
10
 This is a massive simplification. For a brief overview of Kant‟s categorical imperative see “Kant‟s Moral 
Philosophy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified April 6, 2008, accessed April 12 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/.   
11
 I will primarily be focusing on Snyder‟s arguments for duties of beneficence on sweatshops and MNEs.   
12
 Thus far, I have used “MNE” and “sweatshop” to refer to two separate agents. I will use “participants” to 
refer to anyone who can be demonstrated to be operating within the causal chain of structural injustice. 
This could include sweatshops, the MNEs who contract sweatshops, consumers or various governmental 
bodies. Generally, however, “participants” will refer to either MNEs or sweatshops themselves, as they are 
the direct participants that I am concerned with in this paper. Participants are to be understood as distinct 
from perpetuators of structural injustice. Not all participants are direct perpetuators, but some have argued 
that all participants, via their participation, perpetuate. Here, participant merely means an agent or group of 
agents that are involved in an unjust system but are not the primary victims of that injustice and have not 
directly caused it.  
13
 See the critics referenced in footnote 7, as well as Iris Marion Young. "Responsibility and Global Justice: 
A Social Connection Model." Social Philosophy And Policy 23, no. 1: 102-130 (2006). Philosopher's 
Index, EBSCOhost (accessed April 27, 2014).  
6 
 
poor better off, it does not necessarily follow that we ought to allow them to be exploited. 
All claims of this nature more or less ascribe a moral obligation on participants to rectify 
the “structural injustices” that motivated them to take part in the first place. 
Empirical evidence is highly relevant in sweatshop ethics because there are 
innumerable different cases that could be considered spanning the complex history of 
low-wage manufacturing and labor outsourcing. These complexities can cause arguments 
in the sweatshop debate to become convoluted and hinge on disagreements over marginal 
differences in the data or economic theory itself.
14
 Further, there is contention over the 
truth and moral relevancy of that data, which makes it difficult to appeal to some 
overarching ethical framework to assess the moral permissibility of sweatshop labor. 
Instead of evaluating every possible scenario, philosophers have sought to assess the 
libertarian view from a variety of different angles, incorporating varying amounts of 
empirical data. 
In this paper, I will be focusing mainly on arguments grounded in normative 
ethical theory, not empirical data. However, I cannot disregard relevant empirical 
evidence because it affects the normative claims I would like to address. To account for 
this, I will make a number of descriptive assumptions that set the stage in order to arrive 
at my point of interest in the ethical debate.  
                                                          
14
 For an example of a contemporary debate in this vein, see the critics mentioned in footnote 6 the 
discussion between Ari Kohen, Jeff Miller and Zwolinski in a blog post by Zwolinski. Matt Zwolinski, 
“Shouldn‟t Sweatshops Do More?” Bleeding Heart Libertarians: Free Markets and Social Justice. 
November 3, 2011, accessed March 10, 2014, http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2011/11/shouldnt-
sweatshops-do-more/.  
7 
 
In section one I survey some of the contemporary literature on the classic 
libertarian argument to provide background for the situational assumptions I will be 
making. I eventually conclude that the classical libertarian perspective does maximize 
overall social utility given the restrictions and parameters in the situations I am concerned 
with. The question then will be whether policies in alignment with that view are morally 
permissible. Should we require that sweatshop employers compensate workers above the 
market rate, or otherwise rectify the background structural injustices that perpetuate 
sweatshop exploitation, even if doing so may have negative consequences? Section two 
will address this by evaluating some of the most successful attacks on the implicit 
assumptions necessary to reach the libertarian‟s conclusion that sweatshop labor is 
permissible. In the final section I will offer my own opinions on the arguments of both 
sides, and synthesize a suggestion that I think satisfies most of the morally relevant 
factors in the instances I aim to address.
15
  
The Descriptive Claims of the Classical Libertarian Argument 
The classical libertarian argument in favor of sweatshops looks something like 
this:  
Premise 1: One of the best ways to fight global poverty is through the use of low-
wage labor. To require that participants or employers compensate workers above 
the market rate, or do anything else to rectify the structural injustices that enable 
                                                          
15
 This is an ambitious task but I should remind my readers that the cases I will be considering are specific. 
My conclusion will not be applicable to all cases of sweatshop labor. It is necessary for proponents of either 
position to evaluate the varying empirical data in each circumstance. Nevertheless, I think we can make 
significant contribution to the discussion without stipulating every relevant detail.  
8 
 
their exploitation, would be to shift the cost of doing so to the workers themselves 
due to the relationship between price and demand. Therefore, the best way to 
increase the welfare of the global impoverished is to allow sweatshops to operate 
freely within competitive markets. Everybody is better off and nobody is worse 
off [descriptive claim]. 
Premise 2: In a situation like this, it is morally permissible to pursue acts that 
make everybody better off without making anybody worse off [intuitive 
normative assumption].  
Conclusion: It is morally permissible for employers not to take costly actions to 
rectify structural injustice or compensate workers above the market rate 
[conclusion from 1, 2]. 
Critics have argued that to draw the final conclusion from Premise 1 would be to 
ignore the very moral grounds that make sweatshop labor wrong to begin with. One of 
the historically dominant moral arguments against Premise 2 is that even if transactions 
are mutually beneficial and utility-maximizing they can still be wrongfully exploitative 
and morally impermissible due to inherent unfairness in the transaction.
16
 Sweatshop 
proponents have criticized this claim. In the following section I will briefly summarize 
the debate. 
 
 
                                                          
16
 See of these early accounts were described in Meyers “Wrongful Beneficence” and Mayer “Sweatshops, 
Exploitation and Moral Responsibility.”   
9 
 
Unfairness as Wrongful Exploitation 
Claims that sweatshops and the MNEs that contract them are unfair are usually 
two pronged. One component is that the allocation of costs and benefits are themselves 
unfair. Sweatshops and MNEs are wrongfully benefitting from their workers due to an 
objectionably disproportionately distribution of costs and benefits. Perhaps the 
sweatshops and MNEs are making objectionably more in revenues than the workers are 
getting in wages. The other component focuses on “discretionary exploitation.”17 The 
charge is that sweatshops capitalize on monopoly-like powers to compensate their 
workers at an unfair and morally objectionable level to maximize their own gains. The 
fact that workers agree to these terms does not necessarily absolve sweatshops of moral 
blame.
18
  
Cost and benefit arguments necessarily depend on the empirical facts of each 
situation. Though some critics argue that MNE‟s seem to intuitively profit unfairly in 
relation to the benefits gained by sweatshop workers, it is not necessarily true that this is 
the case, at least on a transactional level. The costs and benefits in transactions between 
sweatshops and individual workers are complicated, and it is sometimes difficult to argue 
that they are “unfair” in terms of fair distribution of costs and benefits. Matt Zwolinski, a 
contemporary champion of something resembling the classical libertarian view, makes 
the point that “the compensation sweatshop workers receive for their labor is generally no 
higher than the amount they contribute to the firm (their marginal revenue product), and 
                                                          
17
 See Mayer “Sweatshops, Exploitation,” 605.   
18
 This claim is supported by Snyder in “Exploitation and Sweatshop Labor” and contested in Matt 
Zwolinski. "Sweatshops, Choice, and Exploitation." Business Ethics Quarterly 17, no. 4: 689-727 (2007). 
Philosopher's Index, EBSCOhost (accessed April 27, 2014). 
10 
 
no lower than the value they place on their next base alternative employment.”19 
Additionally, “the amount that actually accrues to [sweatshop utilizing MNEs] as profit is 
generally no greater as a percentage of their investment than the profits in any other 
competitive industry.”20  
Zwolinski thinks that part of the reason the charge of unfairness is difficult is 
because no one has offered a general principle of fair distribution.
21
 No one has 
sufficiently argued, beyond an appeal to some arbitrary and intuitive degree, precisely 
when a transaction is unfair and thus wrongfully exploitative. Further, it is not 
immediately clear that a disproportionate distribution of costs and benefits in a trade is 
inherently unfair or wrong.
22
 Zwolinski puts the nail in the coffin by pointing out that 
even Denis Arnold, one of the most adamant sweatshop critics, now agrees that a 
                                                          
19
 Again, this claim is heavily reliant upon empirical data that may be controversial. Powell and Zwolinski 
do not seem to think this data is controversial. In several of his papers Zwolinski cites studies examined by 
both critics and proponents that suggest that many individual transactions between sweatshop and worker 
cannot legitimately be considered unfair when unfairness is determined via analysis of a distribution of 
costs and benefits. Powell and Zwolinski, “The Ethical and Economic Case,”466-67. 
20
 Zwolinski here asserts that the intuition that sweatshops or the MNEs that contract them are benefiting 
disproportionately is often misguided. He provides an example. Say “a sweatshop worker who produces a 
pair of Reebok shoes is paid only one US dollar to make a shoe that sells for around $100 does not mean 
that [Reebok] is walking away from the exchange with $99 and the worker with only $1.” Instead, much of 
the $99 goes to other costs such as advertising, retailer markup, raw materials, transportation, taxes, etc. 
For this reason, he finds that it is difficult to argue that MNEs are earning “unusually high profits off the 
backs of sweatshop workers.” Ibid., 467 
21
 Ibid., 466  
22
 Though there are certainly some cases where sweatshops act as discretionary exploiters and compensate 
at morally reprehensible levels, as in Meyers‟ rescue example that we will see shortly, it is more difficult to 
quantify unfairness for non-discretionary sweatshops that operate within competitive markets. For this 
reason even Snyder admits that “while Meyers is able to give voice to the common intuition that MNEs 
profit unfairly when compared to the benefits gained by unskilled workers in sweatshops, more would need 
to be said about the standard of proportionality in measuring fairness. It is not self-evident why 
disproportionate benefit is a matter of moral concern, particularly when we consider that well-off persons 
might benefit disproportionately from one another without raising the same concerns of exploitation.” 
Snyder offers an example in which two well-off persons benefit disproportionately while exchanging 
money for art without raising concerns of exploitation. He finds that this suggests “that it is the desperate 
situation of the workers alone and not the fairness of the exchange that motivates concerns of exploitation.” 
Snyder, “Needs Exploitation,” 391.   
11 
 
transactional account of sweatshop exploitation is thin.
23
  It might still be the case that 
sweatshops are benefitting unfairly overall, but focusing on the marginal costs and 
benefits in sweatshop to employee transactions will not be especially fruitful in proving 
this.
24
 If sweatshops are not necessarily wrongfully exploiting individual workers via 
unfair distribution, perhaps we are looking for unfairness in the wrong place. Maybe an 
account of monopolistic exploitation will be more successful. 
The philosophical basis for the argument that sweatshops take unfair advantage of 
their workers is the idea that for party A to wrongfully exploit party B, party A must take 
unfair advantage of B.
25
 Critics argue that sweatshops are clearly taking unfair advantage 
of workers and thus wrongfully exploiting them. Sweatshop proponents then pointed out 
that sweatshop-worker transactions may not be wrongfully exploitative, regardless of the 
issues with “fairness,” because the agreements were both mutually accepted (even highly 
desired) and mutually beneficial.
26
 At first, this seemed enticing. If asked whether a 
mutually beneficial and mutually accepted transaction between two well-informed and 
free agents could possibly be unfair, most would probably say “no” because no one 
would agree to terms that harm them. For example, if Jonathan has some product or 
                                                          
23
 Zwolinski, “Structural Exploitation,” 166. Zwolinski references Arnold, “Exploitation and the Sweatshop 
Quandry,” 252-53, and Arnold, “Working Conditions: Safety and Sweatshops,” 643. Snyder, also 
recognizing that a fairness account is problematic, finds that a dignity account grounded in Kantian respect 
for persons would be more promising. Snyder, “Needs Exploitation,” 393.  
24
 Insert citation from Snyder about micro and macro unfairness  
25
 The concept of exploitation is itself widely debated. Many philosophers have pointed out that 
exploitation is not necessarily pejorative in itself. Consider a tennis player who exploits his opponent‟s 
weakness or a venture capitalist who takes advantage of an investment opportunity. There is debate over 
wrongful exploitation versus other kinds of exploitation, but for the purposes of this paper, exploitation will 
be viewed pejoratively. For further considerations of what constitutes wrongful exploitation, see Alan 
Wertheimer, Exploitation (Princeton University Press, 1996); Zwolinski, “Structural Exploitation,” 156-61; 
Powell and Zwolinski, “The Ethical and Economic Case,” 466-70; Snyder, “Exploitation and Sweatshop 
Labor;” Meyers, “Wrongful Beneficence;” Mayer, “Sweatshops, Exploitation and Moral Responsibility;” 
and Miller, “Why Economists are Wrong.”  
26
 Maitland, “The Great Non-Debate,” 434.  
12 
 
service and sells it to Andrew, assuming that Andrew wants the product and Jonathan 
wants to sell it, and both parties agree to the terms, it seems safe to conclude that no 
wrong deed has been committed. Despite these inclinations, mutually advantageous and 
consensual transactions can still appear to be wrongfully exploitative.  
Consider this example offered by Chris Meyers. Some motorist (A) stumbles 
across someone stranded in the desert (B). A capitalizes on his monopolistic position by 
charging B an exorbitant sum, say, sodomy, or the entirety of B‟s net worth for the next 
ten years. We can conclude that by accepting A‟s offer, B values his life more than A‟s 
demands, and A is rewarded for his services. The transaction is therefore both mutually 
accepted and mutually beneficial, but still seems wrong. This example might sound 
ridiculous and even offensive but the point Meyers is trying to make here is that there is 
clearly some point at which we can all agree an exchange is wrongfully exploitative, even 
if both parties agree to the terms. Perhaps sweatshops are acting as A did in deliberately 
compensating workers significantly below what they could be paying. Perhaps 
sweatshops, like A, are freely exploiting workers to their discretion, solely to maximize 
their own gains. The fact that both parties benefit and agreed to the terms does not 
necessarily mean that sweatshops have not acted wrongly. Because this concept is 
described particularly well by Robert Mayer, I too will refer to sweatshops that operate in 
this way as “discretionary exploiters.”27  
                                                          
27
 Mayer, “Sweatshops, Exploitation and Moral Responsibility,” 605.   
13 
 
But sweatshop proponents have pointed out that rescue examples like these are 
not particularly useful in analyzing sweatshop cases.
28
 In some cases, sweatshops are 
operating within a competitive environment that influences and restricts the level at 
which they can compensate workers without negative consequences. Discretionarily 
exploitative desert rescuers are free to charge the stranded to their discretion, while 
sweatshops offering wages in competitive markets cannot do the same. If they 
compensate workers above the market rate they will reduce their own demand for labor 
or sacrifice the competitive viability of their business.
29
 Almost everyone agrees that 
charges of unfairness might be legitimate if the MNEs or sweatshops in question choose 
to operate as discretionary exploiters, leveraging their monopolistic powers to 
compensate workers less than what is morally permissible. But critics on both sides have 
recognized that competitive restrictions exist and, some cases, limit an employer‟s ability 
to compensate at a higher level without negative externalities.  
If critics cannot easily argue that a sweatshop is exploiting its workers on a micro-
transactional level, and it is not acting as a discretionary exploiter, perhaps it is the larger 
system, or the unjust background and structural circumstances responsible for allowing 
the global poor to be exploited in the first place that is truly unfair. In the following 
section I will describe what structural injustice is and how it typically manifests.  
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Background Structural Injustice 
Iris Marion Young defines background structural injustice as existing “when 
social processes put large categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination 
or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities.”30 This usually 
occurs in the form of stifling competition, suppressing workers‟ unions, directly or 
indirectly reducing overall employment opportunities on a macro-level, or consolidating 
land holdings that abolish historically effective means of subsistence.
31
 Young and others 
argue that structural injustices limit workers‟ employment options, inspire them to waive 
their rights to adequate benefits, and drive them to the doorstep of otherwise highly 
undesirable and exploitative sweatshops.
32
 
Structural injustice generally originates from one of three places: (1) governments 
or their agents have generated it to incentivize foreign investment or further their own 
self-interest. (2) Sweatshops or MNEs have collaborated, coerced or incentivized foreign 
governments to perpetuate structural injustice to further their own self-interest. (3) The 
nature of international trade, political institutions, history or some combination of guns, 
germs and steel
33
 has played the only role in creating the injustice, and no person(s) 
living or dead can be shown to be causally linked to it.  
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I would like to pause here to make two brief statements. For the purposes of this 
paper, I will not be considering origins of the third kind. I am only concerned with 
structural injustice that has been perpetuated via the direct actions of some party capable 
of legitimately receiving blame and responsibility for rectification. Second, I agree with 
Zwolinski, Mayer, and the arguments and intuitions of many others, that structural 
injustice of the second origin is morally impermissible. In Zwolinski‟s words, MNEs that 
work with foreign governments to suppress workers or competition “are guilty of not 
only benefiting from structural in justice but also perpetuating it for their own gain. This 
is wrongful exploitation of the clearest sort.”34 These kinds of actions do parallel those of 
Meyers‟ discretionary exploitative rescuers discussed above. These MNEs are not only to 
blame for blatant and deliberate injustice, but are responsible for rectifying it under a 
standard model of liability.
35
 The wrongness of their actions seems fairly uncontroversial. 
All arguments that I am considering agree that structural injustice exists and it is 
generally the cause of one of the origins described above. Though discretionary 
exploitation cases seem clear, assigning blame or responsibility becomes more difficult 
when the MNE or sweatshop did not directly animate the structural injustice but simply 
chose to play within a system that existed independently. It is here that we begin to see 
one of the fundamental normative disagreements between sweatshop proponents and 
critics. The debate focuses on whether mere participants in structural injustice have any 
special obligation to rectify it, or compensate for its unfairness. In the following section, I 
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will outline some of the more convincing arguments for a duty to rectify and then present 
some of the practical problems with such an obligation.  
Background Structural Injustice: The Responsibility to Rectify 
Some have argued that though structural injustice exists independently of direct 
actions taken on behalf of sweatshops or the MNEs that contract them, participants in the 
injustice nevertheless have some obligation to rectify it. The origin of this obligation, and 
the ways in which participants are required to „right the wrongs,‟ varies from critic to 
critic. Young and Jeremy Snyder offer two particularly influential arguments for 
rectifying structural injustice and provide corresponding prescriptions for participants.  
In contemporary Western thought and legal reasoning, we usually derive 
responsibility for rectifying the wrongness of some action or situation via what Young 
refers to as the standard liability model of responsibility. The standard liability model 
says if the actions of one party can be found to be causally connected to the 
circumstances for which responsibility is sought, and were done so voluntarily and 
undertaken knowingly, it is appropriate to blame that party for the harmful outcome. The 
result of this blame is almost always either punishment or a responsibility ascribed to the 
party to make right the wrong they have committed.
36
  
Young does not find the standard liability model sufficient for assigning blame or 
responsibility to MNEs who are “connected but removed from” structural injustice.37 The 
inherent assumption in the standard liability model is that there must be a fairly direct 
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interaction between the wrongdoer and the wronged party. The problem in assigning 
blame or responsibility to non-discretionary exploiting sweatshops is that they are not 
directly responsible for the structural injustice. They are merely choosing to participate 
in an unjust system that exists regardless of their involvement.  
Where structural social processes constrain and enable many actions in complex 
relations, however, those with the greatest power in the system, or those who 
derive benefits from its operations, may well be removed from an interaction with 
those who are most harmed in it. While it is usually inappropriate to blame those 
agents who are connected to but removed from the harm, it is also inappropriate, I 
suggest, to allow them (us) to say that they (we) have nothing to do with it.
38
 
On Young‟s account, MNEs of this kind must take a “forward-looking” approach 
at rectification, as we will soon see, because of the MNE‟s “social connection” to its 
workers. She suggests this entails some kind of shared political responsibility of all those 
involved that includes “joining with others to organize collective action to reform unjust 
structures.” Her exact conclusions are vague, but she is explicit in her statement that 
participants may fulfill this duty by “trying to persuade others that the treatment of these 
workers is unacceptable and that we collectively can alter social practices and 
institutional rules and priorities to prevent such treatment.”39  
Young describes two distinct ways that we use the term “responsible.” In one 
sense, “to be responsible is to be guilty or at fault for having caused a harm.”40 In the 
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another sense, “people have certain responsibilities by virtue of their social roles or 
positions, as when we say that a teacher has specific responsibilities, or when we appeal 
to our responsibilities as citizens.”41 Young draws more on the latter interpretation to 
establish a “social connection” model of responsibility. She gleans this idea from various 
theorists of global justice who argued for some version of the “widely accepted 
philosophical view” that “obligations of justice [to others] are defined by membership in 
a common political community.”42 Young finds this account wanting because obligations 
of justice can arise between people who are connected via various “social processes,” not 
only from being united under a common constitution.
43
 The responsibility of justice to 
others therefore does not originate from being united under the same flag, but spans 
across political boarders. It is derived from “belonging together with others in a system of 
independent processes of cooperation and competition through which we seek to benefit 
and aim to realize projects…within this scheme of social cooperation, each of us expects 
justice toward ourselves, and others can legitimately make claims on us.”44 
Young‟s account becomes slightly unclear when she seems to intertwine these 
two interpretations of responsibility to assign a duty of rectification to sweatshops who 
are “connected to but removed from” structural injustice. She says: 
The social connection model of responsibility says that individuals bear 
responsibility for structural injustice because they contribute by their actions to 
the processes that produce unjust outcomes. Our responsibility derives from 
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belonging together with others in a system of interdependent processes of 
cooperation and competition through which we seek benefits and aim to realize 
projects.
45
 
Though Young does state that her social connection model shares “a reference to 
causes of wrongs” with the standard liability model, it seems like she has offered an 
account that incorporates both understandings of responsibility, rather than provided an 
independent supplement to the standard liability theory as she originally intended.
46
 
Regardless, Young argues that sweatshops bear a responsibility for rectifying structural 
injustice, even if they did not directly create it, because of a connection to their 
employees.  
Snyder, an adamant sweatshop critic, offers an account of rectification that he 
refers to as “needs exploitation.” His argument is a variation on Young that derives 
responsibility from an inherent duty to respect human beings and their needs as such. 
Snyder argues that it is not just a social connection or standard liability that entails a 
responsibility to rectify structural injustice, but a “duty of beneficence” to the sweatshop 
workers by virtue of their humanity. The foundation of Snyder‟s claim rests on “a core 
intuition that we all should have access to the basic goods necessary to live a distinctly 
human life.”47 Because humans are uniquely distinct animals in their ability to “endorse 
ends beyond those of immediate use to survival or those proposed by instinct,” they 
require a set of basic needs to live the “good life” that they are able to conceive. The 
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premise Snyder needs us to accept is that “actions that fail to respect this kind of life in 
others will not value humans appropriately.”48 
Snyder begins by stating that “a wide variety of moral theories can agree that 
others‟ basic needs exert some sort of claim on us.”49 He explains that one of these 
theories is a Kantian-based “duty of beneficence.”50A proper understanding of this duty, 
Snyder argues, “helps to ground and specify a set of constraints, over and above the 
constraints against coercion and manipulation, that wealthy employers face when setting 
the terms of interactions.”51 Snyder explains that this is an obligation to help others 
achieve the “decent minimum for living a distinctly human life.” The duty normally takes 
an “imperfect form,” which allows individuals flexibility in determining how to allocate 
their resources to help other people live a respectable life. However, when we enter into 
relationships with other people, as we do in the case of sweatshops, this obligation 
narrows into a strict, perfect form.  
The perfect form of the duty of beneficence relies, I am claiming, on connections 
to particular others through our roles and relationships… in this way, the general 
duty to support the basic needs of others becomes more concrete through a 
process of specification, such that the once general duty is now owed, with 
specific content, to particular others.
52
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For Snyder, supporting the basic needs of one‟s workers in perfect form mandates a duty 
to sacrifice “superfluous riches” in order to help employees achieve a decent minimum 
standard of living.
53
  
In the case of employment relationships, in short, employers do not simply have 
an imperfect duty to help some of their employees to achieve a decent minimum 
some of the time; rather, employers are required to cede as much of their benefit 
from the interaction to their employees as is reasonably possible toward the end of 
the employees achieving a decent minimum standard of living.
54
 
Recognizing that complying with these duties under certain restrictive market 
conditions might result in a reduction in profits for employers, Snyder argues that we can 
reduce an employer‟s duty by limiting how much we can reasonably ask them to sacrifice 
for their workers. The employer is not required “to cede all benefits down to [the 
threshold of well-being]. Rather, the various dimensions of well-being will admit of 
degrees between a deficit, flourishing, and excess, and [the employer] is required only to 
cede those shares of gain that would fund her access to the last.”55 Snyder argues that 
adding to one‟s own well-being at the expense of others is to be “inconsistent with an 
appropriate regard for others as moral equals.”56 It is not merely unfairness, connection or 
perpetuation of injustice that requires labor-exporting MNEs to combat background 
circumstances. Rather, Snyder‟s responsibility stems from a duty of beneficence that 
takes a strict form when MNEs have entered into relationships with others. For 
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employers, this means refraining from opulent luxuries when employees‟ basic needs are 
not being met.
57
  
Young and Snyder‟s arguments have been covered quickly, but the point is not to 
evaluate them. Rather, the intent is to demonstrate that whether via social connection, 
Kantian-based duties, or simple liability from causal demonstration, Young and Snyder 
agree that sweatshops and the corporations that contract them have a duty to rectify the 
structural injustices that allow them to exploit their workers. In the following section I 
will present Zwolinski‟s response that even if we do have these duties, we are not always 
obligated to fulfill them.  
Background Structural Injustice: The Implications of Rectification 
In the previous section, I presented two arguments for why participants in 
structural injustice bear a responsibility for rectifying it. In this section I will explain why 
Zwolinski does not necessarily agree that they should. I would like to note that Zwolinski 
grants Snyder and Young‟s claim that entering into an employment relationship with 
needy workers does establish a strict duty of beneficence.
58
 For the purposes of moving 
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forward, I am now in agreement with Young, Snyder and Zwolinski that the sweatshop 
does owe a certain level of wages or compensation package to their workers.
59
 
Zwolinski‟s problem, as we will see, is that regardless of the strength or origin of this 
duty, it does not necessarily follow that MNEs and sweatshops ought to adhere to it, or 
that workers cannot waive their rights to that level of benefits in circumstances where it is 
advantageous for workers to do so. Zwolinski presents two arguments in support of this 
belief. The first is that rectification may effectively harm workers. The second is that to 
adhere to this duty anyway would be to interfere with the very purpose of the duty. 
Though they are to be understood together, I will summarize these claims independently, 
and then I will present Snyder‟s response.60  
1. Rectification Can Have Negative Externalities  
In a recent blog post responding to a different sweatshop critic, Zwolinski 
explains that we often feel that sweatshops have an obligation to “do more” for their 
workers for two reasons: (1) their workers are in great need of help, and (2) sweatshops 
are in the position to give it. Zwolinski says that proponents of (2) are often misguided or 
overestimate the extent to which sweatshops actually can help.
61
 Though the arguments 
he raises in this paper do not address the arguments for duty and responsibility raised by 
Young and Snyder, the important takeaway is that “doing more,” or compensating 
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workers at above the market rate, might produce negative externalities that are then 
shifted to the workers. Zwolinski recapitulates the neoclassical theories I discussed in the 
introduction: “If economic agents demand less of a good the more that good costs, then 
any policies that raise the cost of sweatshop labor will result in less labor being 
demanded, i.e. unemployment.”62 Zwolinski‟s fear is that if Young, Snyder, or anybody 
advocate for a strict duty to compensate workers (whether employers “compensate” via 
direct increase in wages, investing capital to improve conditions, incurring any kind of 
costs related to political action) above the market rate, the result would be to employ less 
workers.  
Zwolinski believes that many of his opponents accept this basic and widely 
recognized neoclassical price theory, but “the dispute lies in determining the correct 
understanding and implications of that framework.”63 There is debate, we will see, about 
which actions will produce negative externalities, but the important point for now is that 
we all accept that some rectification efforts will shift the cost of doing so to the workers 
because of the relationship between price and demand. In the next section I will explain 
why Zwolinski finds that shifting these costs to the workers is not only anti-utilitarian, 
but does not seem to be in alignment with the deontological values of his opponents.  
2. Rectification Despite Negative Externalities Does not Maximize Utilitarianism, 
Welfare, or Autonomy  
Zwolinski entertains the claim that entering into relationships with workers can 
establish some set of new duties to those workers, but argues that because fulfilling these 
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obligations can harm workers, the duties should be waivable by employees if they 
determine that doing so would make them better off.
64
 He provides the following 
example. Suppose that compliance with Snyder‟s duty of beneficence requires that an 
MNE provide benefits of Y to an employee, but the employer is only willing to provide a 
benefit amount of X, where X < Y (Assumedly, the employer is unwilling to grant Y 
because it would result in a reduction in the demand for labor or otherwise harm 
workers). Given that it is permissible for employers not to hire anyone at all can the 
employer make an offer contingent upon the employees willingness waive X and accept 
Y?  
Zwolinski says that if employees can waive their claim to benefits Y when it is in 
their interest to do so, then employers are not necessarily acting wrongly in providing X. 
If employees cannot waive their claim to benefits Y, then, under Snyder‟s account, 
“employers are forbidden from entering into agreements with employees to hire them at 
wage level X…even if hiring them at level X is better for both workers and employers 
than not hiring them at all, and even if both workers and employers would prefer to enter 
into an employment relationship at wage level X than to not enter into any wage 
relationship at all.”65 Zwolinski argues that maintaining this view would be illogical. 
The underlying assumption here is that the non-worseness claim (NWC) is true. 
The NWC was first considered by Alan Wertheimer but later adopted by Zwolinski to 
support the classic libertarian view.
66
 In short, the NWC argues that it is impossible that a 
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mutually beneficial, mutually accepted transaction can be morally worse than no 
transaction at all.
67
 The trouble with rejecting the NWC is that it causes us to conclude 
that it is better for an MNE to avoid a mutually beneficial transaction (open a sweatshop) 
than to help lift the third world workers from poverty (provide a better alternative to all 
their present options). If the MNE would make a lower yield investing domestically than 
opening an international sweatshop, which seems obvious if they were deterred from 
international investment solely to avoid exploitative moral wrongness, then both the 
MNE and the global poor would be worse off.
68
  
I would like to interject briefly to note that there are significant problems with the 
NWC as a theory in general. Adhering to the NWC has a tendency to produce outcomes 
that many people would find morally impermissible.
69
 However, Zwolinski does not 
advocate that we always act in accordance with the NWC. He argues that in this 
circumstance, under the restrictive parameters that we have described, accepting the risks 
of the NWC produces the best overall outcome and, as will see, rejecting it here is 
problematic.
70
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Zwolinski raises the objection that if Snyder were to argue that employees cannot 
waive their moral claim on the benefits to which they are entitled, he is “committed to 
holding that failing to benefit needy workers at all is better than benefiting them at a level 
which is (significantly) greater than zero but less than the morally required amount – 
even if workers themselves would strongly prefer and would like to choose the latter over 
the former.”71 This claim would be in conflict with the principle of utility-maximization 
that Zwolinski finds should take precedent over deontological duties that may make 
workers worse off.  
Additionally, holding this view would seem to be in conflict with two core moral 
values “that both consequentialists and Kantians must recognize: welfare and 
autonomy.”72 If the concern is welfare for the poor, then to ban rights-waving is to reject 
transactions that increase workers‟ welfare. If the theory claims to value autonomy, then 
we are certainly not respecting theirs by banning their right to judge that the benefits they 
could gain by doing so are worth the cost. Essentially, the fundamental problem is that 
subscribing to a normative ethical view in the vein of Kant, Young or Snyder is to value 
that theory over the people that the theory is intended to protect. Zwolinski summarizes 
this idea well. “Not only is the rejection of NWC counterintuitive, then, it also seems to 
involve a kind of paternalistic substitution of the moral theorist‟s own values for those of 
the workers themselves.”73  
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The bottom line for Zwolinski and perhaps utilitarian proponents in general is that 
sweatshops may be taking advantage of the workers‟ antecedent circumstances, but it is 
hard to argue that this advantage is unfair or wrongfully exploitative. The participants are 
operating within a system that may be unjust but through their participation, MNEs and 
sweatshops are helping workers and benefitting themselves in the process – overall, 
everyone is better off and nobody is worse off. To deny the NWC and require that 
participants pursue actions that would shift costs to the workers would not make anybody 
better off, and would simultaneously be in conflict with the generally held values of 
welfare and autonomy.  
Sweatshops, even if acting exploitatively, are at least doing something that 
provides substantial benefit to people in desperate need. By contrast, the vast 
majority of us – including companies that do not outsource their production 
overseas – do nothing to provide any comparable benefit. If this is exploitation, 
then how bad can exploitation be?
74
 
Background Structural Injustice: The Anti-Utilitarian Response 
Snyder recognizes that some may find these issues to be problematic for his 
account of beneficence, but argues that they do not absolve MNEs and sweatshops of 
their duties to their workers. In this section I will detail Snyder‟s response to the 
criticisms offered above.  
1. Some Rectifying Acts May Have Negative Externalities, So Pursue Others  
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Snyder agrees with Zwolinski that the demand curve is downward sloping, and 
that some forms of rectification above the market rate can harm workers,
75
 but argues that 
there are still things sweatshops and MNEs can do to make things better for their workers 
that would not bring about the negative externalities that Zwolinski fears.  
He offers a hypothetical situation in which competition is stiff and market forces 
are restrictive. Compensating workers with a wage package “consistent with a decent 
minimum for living a distinctly human life” would be to “destroy the viability of [the] 
business, throwing [the] employees back into the labor pool.”76 In these circumstances, 
“offering a living wage is not required” but rather, “when external constraints limit one‟s 
ability to meet the ideal baseline for treatment of others, progress toward the ideal is 
morally acceptable.”77 For Snyder, this progress manifests as a duty to “pursue as many 
lower cost options for improving employee welfare as are reasonable.”78  
Snyder presents a brief case study of Nike who instituted various education 
programs and microenterprise loan services for their employees. He reports that Adidas 
“increased fire escape routes, better access to first aid, safer use of hazardous materials, 
and changes in training for the use of potentially dangerous machinery.”79 Sweatshops 
and MNEs could advocate politically, as Young suggests, or even target consumers who 
are willing to pay more for goods that offer workers a living wage. Snyder finds that 
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these suggestions can help MNEs and sweatshops meet the duties to their employers 
“while remaining consistent with the market constraints” affecting them.80 The empirical 
feasibility of these remedies is obviously contingent upon various circumstances such as 
the bargaining power of the MNE, and the resources available, but Snyder‟s point is that 
there might be something participants can do that would not shift cost to workers.  
I would like to briefly to consider an objection to this suggestion. Some might 
argue that any action done on behalf of participants, regardless of whether they are 
consistent with market restraints, could have the effect of harming workers when we 
consider the effects of spending „social capital.‟81 Imagine a scenario in which the CEO 
of a multinational sweatshop contracting corporation, in accordance with his “forward-
looking” political duty offered by Young and endorsed by Snyder, sent a letter to the 
home government of his sweatshops. The CEO strongly suggests that if the government 
wants to keep his business they need to take steps to alleviate some of the restrictive and 
unjust conditions under which the workers live. Perhaps the recommendation is that the 
government amends visa guidelines for nurses who wish to work in that country which 
would improve overall access to healthcare. Maybe he suggests that the government alter 
their tax structure to incentivize foreign venture capitalists or factoring funds to finance 
local entrepreneurial ventures in attempts to increase the workers‟ employment options. 
Whatever the recommendation, the CEO is „spending‟ social capital, or influence, by 
sending his letter. The CEO has essentially asked the government to trust him, to change 
their policy based on his recommendation. The CEO has staked the reputation of himself, 
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and his company, on that recommendation. If the government agrees and the result is not 
good for whatever reason, the government would have reason to be unhappy with the 
CEO and the MNE as a whole. I could imagine that government distrusting the entire 
corporation, or even taking some sort of retributive action against them. To incentivize, 
influence, strong-arm or coerce foreign governments to do anything is to take a risk and 
that risk is not cost free. If that risk turns out to be problematic, the effect could be that 
the sweatshop leaves the country, or something else happens that negatively impacts the 
workers in the same way that raising the price of the sweatshops goods would. This 
would be problematic for Young‟s prescription, or any rectification efforts that entail 
political action.  
To foreshadow my final conclusion, I agree social capital risks are a legitimate 
concern. However, I agree with Snyder in that it would be naïve to argue that there is 
nothing that participants can do to make things, if only marginally so, better for their 
workers without shifting the cost to them.
82
 This is not a claim that is strongly contested. 
Even Zwolinski agrees that there are probably things that could be done without these 
risks but he seems to be more conservative than Snyder (and myself) in estimating how 
feasible and implementable these actions are.
83
  We will call actions with no risk of 
negative externalities “safe acts.” Moving forward, we will accept the idea that some 
rectifying acts may shift costs to the employees while others are safe.  
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2. A) After Pursuing “Safe Acts,” We Still Have a Duty to Offer Certain Benefits  
After proposing that there may be some low cost high benefit actions that could 
supplement a participant‟s duty to rectify structural injustice, Snyder eventually 
concludes that in addition to these, participants are still morally obligated to offer a set of 
benefits “even when the market does not require that they be met.”84 For Snyder, 
“employers have an obligation to offer the means for living a minimally decent human 
life for their full-time employees when it is reasonable to do so.”85  
We might be tempted to interpret “reasonable to do so” as the point at which 
workers might be released back into the labor market but this does not seem to be the 
case. Snyder explains that the “criteria of reasonability” instead allows that employers 
“(a) may retain levels of well-being between the limits of deficiency and luxury; and (b) 
the goal of a decent minimum for all persons allows for deviations from the ideal forms 
of moral duties under non-ideal conditions.”86 He explains his duties under non-ideal 
circumstances (circumstances in which MNEs are restricted by markets) most articulately 
in the conclusion:  
Even employment at non-living wage rates, then, can be non-exploitative. By 
offering a wage or pursuing other steps (recall the vase of Debbie the widget 
market) greater than that which both persons would voluntarily arrive at in the 
open market, the employer can express the importance of a minimally decent 
human life for all, particularly if she is aware of the results of abandoning these 
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persons to set their wages on the open market. Should the employer offer a wage 
that allows as much progress toward this goal as is reasonable – understood as 
allowing the employer to retain the means for living a flourishing life short of 
luxuries and to maintain the competitiveness of her company – she promotes 
access to a threshold level of the goods necessary for living a minimally decent 
human life over the long term.
87
 
Essentially, Snyder seems to understand that the living wage he recommends can 
have negative externalities. In these circumstances, corporations should pursue as many 
of these low-cost rectification methods as possible. However, the duty still falls on the 
employer to strive for the moral ideal to cap their revenues before attaining the level of 
“luxury.” With that surplus capital, the employer is able to cede as many benefits to their 
employees as possible (while remaining competitive and living a flourishing life) in order 
to work towards meeting their basic human needs.  This discussion may seem repetitive, 
but the implication is that employers are still responsible for compensating at an 
acceptable level, even if the market sets a lower price. The result then, according to the 
theories we have accepted, would be to produce some level of negative externality.  
2. B)  We Do Not Always Need to Act as Utility-Maximizers 
Snyder directly addresses the criticism that rejecting the NWC results in an 
overall loss of utility. His response is somewhat short but powerful. He argues that as he 
is proposing a deontological account of exploitation, not a utilitarian one, he can simply 
reject that the NWC claim is true. He says that it is not the case that we must always 
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maximize utility, especially when we are discussing people with whom we have entered 
into a working relationship.
88
 Just because an action is better for everyone does not make 
it right. He offers an example to illustrate this sentiment.  
Just as it can be morally better for me to sit on my couch than to manipulate a 
friend into doing something that will be beneficial to him, it can be morally better 
for me to refrain from engaging in an exploitative interaction than to employ 
someone at subsistence wages when higher wages are possible.
89
  
Snyder finds that we ought not to derive moral value from those actions that produce the 
most optimal outcomes for everybody; instead, we ought to derive moral value from 
those actions which are in alignment with our basic duties of justice towards our fellow 
humans. Even though both utilitarianism and duties of beneficence rely upon moral 
judgments, Snyder essentially argues that his is better.  
Snyder does not directly address Zwolinski‟s criticism that a denial of the NWC 
fails to maximize welfare and autonomy. I suspect Snyder would argue, in alignment 
with the position in the preceding paragraph, that welfare and autonomy are not the only 
important components of his needs-based duty of beneficence, and deontological 
accounts in general. There is a popular example in deontology that asks a moral agent 
whether it is permissible to shoot and kill one person to prevent the killing of five other 
people. Most deontologists argue that it is not permissible to kill the one person to save 
the five because we have a special responsibility for the things we do ourselves, not the 
things that we prevent. It may be the case that Snyder et al do in fact value welfare and 
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autonomy. However, they would likely say that it does not necessarily follow that we are 
allowed to pursue morally wrong actions just because they increase welfare and 
autonomy, similarly to how we are not allowed to shoot one person to save five. 
Maximizing utility in this way is in closer alignment with utilitarian or consequentialist 
views, not deontic ones.  
Maximizing Overall Social Utility: The Necessary Assumptions 
Before progressing, I would like to aggregate some of the descriptive assumptions 
that I have made so far. Up until now, this paper has sought to evaluate some of the moral 
charges against sweatshop exploitation. We accepted that sweatshop employment is often 
the best available option for sweatshop workers, but considered whether sweatshop 
exploitation could still be morally impermissible. We first considered whether sweatshop 
exploitation could be wrong on an account of fairness. We found that transactional 
accounts of unfairness were lacking and flimsy when applied to sweatshops, but 
concluded that discretionary exploitation is wrong. We then considered whether 
background structural injustice rendered sweatshop exploitation wrong. We concluded 
that directly causing structural injustice is wrong, but differentiated these from mere 
participants in structural injustice. We agreed that workers are morally entitled to a 
certain level of benefits, and then decided that employers have a duty to provide those 
benefits or rectify structural injustice in various ways. But we saw that acting on those 
duties is problematic in instances when the cost of the act or policy is shifted to the 
workers. Sometimes, the result is to make sweatshop employees even worse off. This 
seemed odd given that workers are the very group that duties of rectification are intended 
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to help. At this point, the descriptive premise of the classical libertarian argument held. 
Sweatshop exploitation, though perhaps unfortunate and wrong, maximizes overall 
utility, welfare and autonomy for some of the world‟s most desperate people while 
making everybody better off and nobody worse off.   
The question we then explored was whether sweatshop exploitation could be 
morally impermissible despite the increase in utility, welfare and autonomy. Should the 
benefits of lassaize fair economics permit lassaiz faire ethics? Or should sweatshops be 
morally obligated to adhere to their duties of justice regardless of whether doing so would 
produce a negative externality. Zwolinski argued that in some circumstances, employers 
ought to be able to compensate workers at a level below what they deserve because the 
outcome is to maximize utility, welfare and autonomy for sweatshop workers. He argued 
that this seemed to be in alignment with the intent of the employer‟s duty to his workers. 
The deontological response to this largely consequentialist claim was that sweatshops and 
MNEs bear a strict, narrow obligation of justice to their workers. Even in non-ideal 
restrictive circumstances, employers are morally obligated to promote access to a 
threshold level of goods necessary for respecting workers‟ humanity. Sweatshop 
exploitation is wrong, and just because it promotes utility does not necessarily permit 
sweatshops to compensate workers at morally objectionable levels.  
In the following section, the task will be to give credence to one view over the 
other. I will then then synthesize a suggestion that I believe considers the most morally 
relevant factors in this circumstance. Before continuing, I would like to present two more 
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arguments that I have derived from the sections preceding. Their conclusions will serve 
as premises to support my final conclusion.    
First: when markets are restrictive, employers ought to identify and pursue those 
actions that increase worker welfare but are not susceptible to the costs and risks of 
negative externalities. I agree with all of the views I have considered herein that 
employers have a duty of justice and beneficence to their workers. Regardless of whether 
we believe that employers ought to pursue those duties in spite of negative externalities, 
it is true that some actions can be taken to address those duties that have few or no 
negative externalities. Therefore, employees ought to pursue these actions that make 
workers‟ lives better, even if only marginally, in accordance with their duty of justice and 
beneficence.  
Critics may find this claim weak because it is difficult (if not impossible) to 
determine which acts are risk free until they have already been implemented. As 
Zwolinski points out, markets are a “discovery process,” and as such these safe acts are to 
be discovered.
90
 Even so, I do not think this absolves employers of the duty to try to find 
them. Until a better method surfaces, an appeal to a combination of intuition, reason, and 
a well conducted data-driven analysis should provide enough information to conclude 
with reasonable accuracy whether an action would shift cost to workers in practical 
application. If employers have fairly good reason to believe that any given action to 
rectify injustice will not shift cost to the workers, they ought to adhere to their duty and 
pursue it. Whether or not we agree employers should compensate above the market rate, 
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they ought to make the easy save, do the quick fix, and pick the low hanging fruit. To fail 
to pursue risk free acts seems like wrongful neglect. I do not think this argument is 
controversial and I am sure the majority of sweatshop critics and proponents alike would 
agree.  
Second: Snyder’s recommendation that employers cap their revenue in 
accordance with the perfect form of their duty to their workers is controversial and 
inconsistent because it reduces the overall utility and welfare of one arbitrarily selected 
group in favor of another, when both groups have equal moral claim on that duty due to 
equal relationship proximity, need and dependence. In a discourse with Zwolinski and 
company, Ari Kohen questions why proponents and critics alike are so tied to this idea 
that “a corporation must (let alone ought) to take advantage of people in such a 
[desperate, exploitable] state.”91 Maybe corporate and consumer greed is the problem and 
we ought to simply take less for ourselves.  
I would take a smaller profit as a shareholder or pay more for a product as a 
consumer if it meant that those products weren‟t being made on the backs of labor 
that couldn‟t complain of their poor pay and poor conditions for fear of losing the 
only job that keeps them (and their families) from even worse conditions and/or 
death. And, even more obviously, if I was someone who lived in crushing 
poverty, I think it‟s clearly right that I‟d be happy for the opportunity to work and 
improve my lot in life… but id also hope that wealthy people wouldn‟t take 
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advantage of me just so that they could make a little bit more money than they 
already make.
92
 
Kohen assumes that corporations are inherently profit-maximizing entities, and to 
anticipate change from within would be counter-intuitive to their very purpose. Kohen 
believes that regulation is therefore the only way to ensure that workers are paid a 
morally acceptable wage.
93
 In a sense, Kohen agrees with Snyder that corporations ought 
to take less profit and cede the benefit to those who need it most.  
In response to Kohen, Jeff Miller again reminds us of the neoclassical 
implications of raising costs or prices. When prices increase, the demand for whatever 
good the corporation produces will fall. When demand for goods fall, the corporation 
requires fewer employees to maintain production, which in turn causes layoffs. Whereas 
Zwolinski argues that layoffs fail to maximize utility, autonomy and welfare, Miller 
makes a slightly different claim. Miller‟s argument is short, but we are to assume that 
Miller agrees that sweatshops are already doing all that they can do. They are not 
withholding another option that might be better for workers, but rather, going above and 
beyond what they are already doing would be to reduce the sweatshop‟s demand for 
labor. Given these assumptions, Miller argues that it is not better for a small number of 
people to be slightly better off via higher wages when another group of people are made 
worse off by losing employment. It would be wrong for sweatshops or MNEs, he says, to 
make this decision for other people. “We ought to let the workers in [global sweatshops] 
make their own choices. Depriving them of [sweatshop] jobs only forecloses a choice 
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they can make; that‟s not likely to make their lives better.”94 I refer to this problem as 
Miller‟s Dilemma. 
Snyder might believe that the actions he has suggested will never result in layoffs, 
but it seems that he would almost certainly be wrong. The duty on corporations to 
compensate workers above the market price by capping their net revenue just below the 
level of “luxury” will affect the demand for labor as corporate management decides to 
pursue other morally safe and more profitable options. Regardless of whether deciding 
against opening a sweatshop for this reason is free of moral repugnance,
95
 adhering to 
Snyder‟s duty is to make the decision that it is morally permissible to make one group of 
workers better off while making another group of workers worse off. We might anticipate 
Snyder‟s deontic response already, but I think Miller‟s Dilemma poses another problem.  
To pursue acts that make some better off and lay off others seems to be in direct 
conflict with Snyder‟s account of the origin of employer duty. Snyder‟s prescriptions 
stem from a strict, perfect duty of beneficence on employers due to their employees‟ 
needs, but also from their working relationship. In a situation where an already open 
sweatshop decides to adopt a rectification policy from Snyder that reduces its overall 
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demand for labor, the employer would be removing that benefit from one group and 
giving it to another when the employer had an equal duty of beneficence and justice to 
both parties prior. Consider the following example.  
Expensive Machinery: A sweatshop manager Jack employs 100 workers. All of 
these workers perform low-skill labor, are in a relatively similar state of need, and 
are all equally depend on Jack for employment. The market for Jack‟s products is 
very competitive, and its forces dictate that he cannot raise his workers‟ wages 
without sending some of them back into the labor pool. Jack feels terrible that his 
workers live in such horrible conditions with inadequate pay and decides that, in 
accordance with Snyder‟s duty of beneficence, he needs to do something anyway. 
Sensing that raising wages may be risky, Jack decides to pursue a lower cost, high 
benefit option.
96
 Jack takes out a loan to purchase a new and expensive piece of 
machinery that will drastically reduce injuries. Over time, the marginal increase 
on Jack‟s production costs unfortunately necessitates the release of 5 of his 
workers.  
We might first consider whether Jack owes less of a duty to some workers than to 
others. Snyder‟s account of determining how much responsibility employers owe is 
somewhat vague, but he essentially argues that a combination of the duration of the 
relationship, the dependence of one party on the other, and the working relationship, or 
connection, permits partiality and generates greater demands for one‟s care on another. 
He states that “the degree to which this specification makes a person responsible for 
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another‟s well-being will be determined by the degree to which the relationship marks a 
dependence of one person on another.”97 He elaborates to explain that “connections and 
dependencies justify the partial treatment of those with whom we are in relationships… 
Specifically, longer and more intimate relationships generate greater demands on one‟s 
own resources for the care of and concern for these persons.”  
Snyder provides nothing for us to reasonably conclude that Jack might owe less to 
some workers than to others, especially if we assume that all workers are equal in relation 
to Jack. Snyder does say that “weaker relationships of dependency will coincide with less 
specification of the duty of beneficence for many members of the MNE.”98 One might 
interpret this to mean that some distant manager in the MNE could fly in to a foreign 
sweatshop and fire the five workers without compromising his duty of beneficence 
because he has no relationship to them and they do not rely specifically on him to meet 
their needs. This seems highly implausible.
99
 Regardless of how we interpret the extent of 
Jack‟s duties, the important point is that according to Snyder‟s account, it seems that Jack 
has an identical duty of beneficence to all 100 of his workers.
100
 Severing employment 
with 5 is not acting in accordance with his duty of beneficence and obligation to help 
them achieve a decent minimum standard of living.  
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Snyder would likely respond that, in accordance with the deontic nature of his 
views, this is again a fundamentally utilitarian argument. What matters is not that we 
have made 5 worse off and 95 better off, what matters is that Jack has worked towards his 
duty of beneficence for the 95. I am skeptical of this response. It seems that revoking a 
duty of justice to someone with whom you already owe that duty is to fail to adhere to the 
most basic component of Snyder‟s claim. This seems to be even more counterintuitive 
when we understand that the 5 employees are in great need, and equally dependent on 
Jack as are the other 95. Snyder has offered us nothing in the form of an argument to 
justify removing a duty from 5 in order to make (marginal) improvements in meeting that 
duty for 95. If he did, he would need to avoid arguing that working towards Jack‟s duty 
to the 95 permits the dismissal of 5. That would be utilitarian.  
It is possible that Miller‟s Dilemma becomes the crux of the sweatshop debate. 
For the time being, the point has been to illustrate that sweatshops, as we have agreed, 
have a duty to provide a certain level of benefits to the workers that they have already 
employed. For these sweatshops to reduce the overall utility, welfare or autonomy of one 
arbitrarily selected group in favor of another, when both are equally needy and 
dependent, seems unjustifiable even on Snyder‟s account. Though this is admittedly a 
fundamentally utilitarian objection, to which Snyder may simply reject in favor of 
deontology, it is important to note the disconnect between the result of his recommended 
remedies and his argument for an employer‟s equal narrow duty.  
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Maximizing Overall Utility: Striving Towards Beneficence 
Up until this point I have made some descriptive assumptions that brought us to 
the claim that allowing sweatshops to compensate at the market rate maximizes overall 
utility under the restrictive parameters of the world in which we live. I then presented 
arguments for and against permitting them to do so. The conclusion that I will offer 
shortly sides more with Zwolinski than the deontologists. Before I offer an argument 
favoring the utility-maximizing action, I would like to introduce a general objection to 
sweatshop exploitation that serves to reinforce my case.  
Some critics might argue that we should just morally condemn, legally prohibit, 
or do whatever is necessary to shut down sweatshops. To successfully orchestrate, or 
even threaten, the simultaneous closing of every international sweatshop until a morally 
acceptable level of structural injustice was remedied might be an efficient and effective 
solution. Surely foreign governments would quickly determine how to make their 
workers better off when forcefully compelled. Perhaps the imposition of a global 
minimum wage would serve workers well.  
Though both suggestions may have some validity, they are unfortunately 
unrealistic. To these critics I have three responses. (1) To pursue acts like this might have 
the same effect of spending social capital. It is difficult to discern the short and long-term 
implications of strong-arming foreign governments in this way. (2) I agree that there are 
almost certainly better ways to fight global poverty and someone should probably figure 
out what those are and execute. However, the reality is that for now, the utility-
maximizing arguments in favor of low wage labor still stand, and we do not have many 
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better alternatives. Further, to remove something that is already having an impact in favor 
of something that may be harmful seems counter-intuitive and counter-productive. (3) 
Due to the highly empirical nature of sweatshop ethics, and applied ethical philosophy in 
general, it is necessary to focus on the reality of the situation and the corresponding 
descriptive claims. In some sense, “ethics is where the rubber meets the road in 
philosophy.”101 One of the most rewarding aspects of ethical theory is arriving at a 
conclusion that might have real-world implications. As nice as it would be to justify 
prescriptions like a one world government or a collective action effort, it would 
ultimately fall on deaf ears as policy makers, academics and pragmatic philosophers 
reject them on the grounds of zero feasibility. 
I think my response to this suggestion highlights the fundamental reason that I 
side more with the utilitarian arguments of the libertarians. Utilitarian and deontological 
arguments both recognize that workers have a right to a certain level of benefits and 
compensation that enables them to live a distinctly human life. Call these benefits X. I 
side with both parties that employers are obligated to provide X for any of the reasons 
offered above. However, adhering to the duty to supply X in some circumstances is to 
work against meeting X because of consequential negative externalities. In these cases, 
the result of granting X anyway would be to bring some workers closer to X, while 
pushing others further away from X. The deontologists have not provided any reason for 
us to agree that choosing to bring some arbitrary group of workers closer to X at the 
expense of others is morally permissible. Rather, they have implicitly suggested that it is 
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permissible because the duty to provide X is narrow and owed equally to all employees 
by virtue of their humanity, some working relationship, need or dependence.  
I recognize the deontologists‟ response to this utilitarian-minded objection but I 
favor the economic truths and descriptive claims of the libertarians over adherence to the 
deontologists‟ normative views. Compensating at a level Y where Y<X, but Y does not 
result in layoffs, is most effective in progressing everyone towards X. We ought to pursue 
whatever actions are most effective in meeting the duties to which both camps ascribe. I 
cannot support many of Snyder‟s recommendations because their negative externalities 
do not promote equal opportunity for reaching X. It also seems that this would be in 
conflict with Snyder‟s own claim that we ought to regard others as “moral equals.”102  
Even if Snyder were to successfully argue that it is permissible to bring some 
workers closer to X and push others away, it seems that increasing utility for more 
workers at level P is better than increasing utility for less workers at level Q even if P>Q. 
I say this because, again appealing to utility maximization, the result would be to make 
more people better off without making anybody worse off. Given the reality of the 
situation and the circumstances that I have described, the best way to strive towards X for 
all is to pursue acts that make everybody better off and nobody worse off. If I sided more 
with the deontologists, I would likely still conclude that striving to reach X has a higher 
moral value than refraining from exploitation because the needs of human beings are 
intuitively more important than our duty to not exploit them. Therefore, striving towards 
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X, in this case, ought to take moral precedent over a duty of beneficence. Consequently, I 
offer this amendment to the classic libertarian argument.  
The Argument 
Premise 1: Sweatshops are often the best available option for impoverished 
workers to provide for themselves and their families. To reduce the demand for 
sweatshop labor is to remove that option from one or more sweatshop workers. 
[Descriptive claim] 
Premise 2: Sweatshop workers have a moral claim on a certain level of dignity 
and justice. To act in accordance with this moral claim is to provide workers with 
a certain standard of benefits in exchange for their labor [normative claim – moral 
intuition]. 
Premise 3: External factors sometimes limit the employer‟s ability to match those 
benefits without reducing the demand for labor. Allowing the market to determine 
worker compensation maximizes overall utility, welfare and autonomy by making 
everybody better off and nobody worse off. Offering market compensation is 
sometimes the best thing that corporations can do without negative externalities 
[descriptive claim]. 
Premise 4: There are some actions that employers could take that would shift the 
cost of doing so to workers, and there are some actions that will not [descriptive 
claim]. 
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Premise 5: It is wrong to engage in acts that make things marginally better for a 
one group of people while making things significantly worse for another group of 
people when the duty of justice is the same for both groups [normative claim – 
intuition from Miller‟s Dilemma]. 
Conclusion: When external actors limit the employer‟s ability to match the 
benefits of P2, the employer should strive to identify all improvements that they 
have reason to believe could promote welfare for the workers, and pursue them 
until any cost of doing so is shifted to the workers themselves [conclusion from 2-
4]. 
This argument is not necessarily intended to support act-utilitarianism or moral 
particularism as an ethical theory in general but in this circumstance accepting the NWC 
in order to make everybody better off and nobody worse off is the strongest argument 
that I have found to support the libertarians. Given the intricate but relevant 
circumstances of this particular situation, appealing to a normative ethical theory in 
attempt to shoot down the implicit normative assumption that it is morally right to do 
what makes everybody better off and nobody worse off is weak because it simply does 
not make things better for the global poor. Sometimes utilitarianism is wrong, this is 
obvious. Sometimes adhering to deontic duties instead of committing a wrong to produce 
a right is morally justified and required. But in this instance acts that maximize utility are 
the best and most realistic options for sweatshop workers.  
 
 
49 
 
Conclusion 
For both sides of the debate empirical evidence is hugely relevant. If, for example, 
we were to discover that capping corporate revenues somehow did not produce any 
negative externalities, perhaps we ought to do so. For the purposes of this paper, 
however, I have been satisfied with neglecting the implications of some of this evidence 
in favor of assumptions grounded in economic theory in order to reach the crux of the 
philosophical debate. Regardless, the reality is that nobody really knows what the 
outcome of various actions will be. This knowledge gap is part of the problem with 
consequentialism in general. What we do know is that we need to be extremely careful 
when considering actions that may eliminate a family‟s best (or only) source of income. 
Though we never know all the facts, we can guess, and I think our duty is to make the 
best one we can.  
Despite the arguments presented to pursue utility-maximizing acts in certain 
circumstances, I am certain that some will still disagree that sweatshops should be 
allowed to exploit workers simply because it makes everyone better off.  It seems to me 
that the moral permissibility of sweatshop exploitation fundamentally reduces to a debate 
between deontological and utilitarian judgments. Sweatshop proponents and critics are 
free to offer evidence, construct hypotheticals, and postulate over the impact of various 
policies to an endless degree, but these discussions ultimately hinge on two contradicting 
moral judgments or opinions:  
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(1) Deontic duties are things that we have to do despite the fact that they are not 
utility maximizing. We must adhere to our ethical values, regardless of what we 
may achieve by compromising them.  
(2) Sacrificing those values can sometimes be justified and permissible if doing so 
produces a better outcome.  
Even if I argue, as I believe I have, that maximizing utility in this circumstance in 
order to strive towards X for the most number of people ought to have a higher lexical 
order or be of greater moral worth than adhering to our deontic duties, some will simply 
disagree. We have consistently seen this to be the case, especially in the discourse 
between Zwolinski and Snyder. I think that for progress to be made on the sweatshop 
debate, all participants must understand that determining the moral permissibility of 
various policies, and their implications, largely hangs on this fundamental philosophical 
disagreement.   
It is regrettable and saddening that such a large percentage of the population lives 
in crippling poverty. Whether the result of some combination of guns, germs and steel, or 
the result of somebody‟s direct instigation, a lot of people are in a very desperate position 
in which a little bit can go a long way. Given that this is the reality, I think the best thing 
to do is to help them in the best way that we can. Often times, sweatshops playing by the 
rules may offer less than we wish they could, but the most helpful thing to do is to allow 
them to do whatever makes their workers better off.  
As unfortunate as it is, most people would rather support themselves and their 
families than not be exploited. Perhaps one day the structural injustices that drive wages 
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and compensation below the morally acceptable level will be eradicated or consumers 
will collectively decide to pay more while somehow maintaining (or increasing) demand 
for sweatshop goods. Until then, I think that the right thing to do is to assess each 
individual situation and critically evaluate what acts maximizes utility, welfare and 
autonomy in practical application. Because these kinds of acts best strive towards 
granting the quality of life that we all agree people deserve, we should pursue them. It is 
for these reasons that I assign moral value to the acts that effectively improve the lives of 
those who need it most. 
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